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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action is an appeal from a decision of the Hon-
orable Ronald 0. Hyde from a trral occurring December 
14, 1970, in Morgan County, Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant requests thaJt the appeal be denied 
and that the judgment of the trial court be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff has not stated the facts in ·the manner 
required by law, i. e., most favorable to the deeisio11: 
Further, she has misinterpreted facts so that a complete 
statement is required. 
The Defendant, who is a life-long resident of .. Morgan 
County and who has lived in the disputed area all hi.' 
life (Tr. 4-5), purchased the ground in dispute in 106.J 
(Tr. 5). It was fenced and a gate was established at 
the road's edge subsequent to the completion of the 
Interstate highway. 
The Defendant purchased the ground from Walter 
Carrigan (Tr. 89). Prior to that it had been in rosse~s­
ion of Carrigan's father and brother at all times mat-
erial hereto (Tr. 89). 
The Plaintiff's daim of title came through Producers 
Livestock Corporation (Tr. 52), who acquired it from 
the Pl1aintiff's father in 1966 (Tr. 52). The Plaintiff', 
father acquired it in 1947 from Alma Grace Harre: 
(Ex. 4). The deed conveyed neither a right-of-way nor 
water rights to the Plaintiff's predecessor in interest. 
The two parcels of ground are adjacent (Ex. A.) 
In 1917 (Ex. 1), the Defendant's father conveyed 
an interest plus an easement in Bohman Springs to the 
Board of Education, as did the Carrigans an the Ogdens 
(Ex. 1). The grant to the School Board was 7.20 acres. 
There was a school on it. Thereafter the School Board 
conveyed the ground to the Petersen Ward in 193; 
(Ex. 2). The Interstate took all of the 7.20 acres ('l'r 
14). There remained only the easement to the pipeline 
and the Petersen Ward conveyed that to the Defendant 
in 1964, because the ward could not use it (Tr. 104). 
The so-called road was put in by the Board of Ed-
ucation about 1920 (Tr. 7, 94, 97). The first pipe was 
wooden (Tr. 97). In 1932-33, the School Board replaced 
2 
the wooden pipe with metal (Tr. 97, 108). Prior to 
this there was no roadway except onto the Carrigan 
property (Tr. 98). When the School Board started "it 
wasn't much of a road," they took a plow up and chopped 
a little brush (Tr. 98). It was later improved by a 
sheepman, Swan, in 1936 (Tr. 109), who agreed to fix 
the road in exchange for the right to go through (Tr. 90). 
In the memory of the Defendant's predecessor in 
interest the way was used by two sheepman, George 
Scheberry and George Swan. When they went through 
the property, they always asked permission (Tr. 89). 
George Swan paid $20.00 for going through, even if he 
didn't pasture (Tr. 93). 
Deer hunters did go through the area (Tr. 91); 
however, there was always a fence and a wire gate 
(Tr. 93), as well as a gate between the Defendant's pro-
perty and the property of the Plaintiff (Tr. 91), which 
gates were left shut (Tr. 91). 
Swan remained on the ground in back until 1952 
and was the only one there (Tr. 118-119). 
Between 1953 and 1957, the ground of the plaintiff 
was used for cattle (Tr. 120) and the gates were locked 
(Tr. 123). Between 1957 and 1964 when the Defendant 
bought the ground, Ithurbode used the road for sheep 
but left the gate locked and a barbed gate in place (Tr. 
123). The Plaintiff admitted that the gate was locked be-
tween 1953-19'57, because her father admitted he had a 
key (Tr. 128). 
The Plaintiff's own witness verified that there were 
always gates in place, going into the Carrigan property 
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(Defendant) and on the other side of the Carrigan 
property going to the Morgan (Plaintiff's) property 
(Tr. 85). 
Finally, Harry Wilkinson a Morgan County Com-
missioner, testified that he knew of no public money 
being expended upon the area (Tr. 107). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
THERE WAS NO PUBLIC ROAD EITHER (A) BY 
PUBLIC USE FOR SIXTY YEARS OR (B) BY A RE-
CORD PUBLIC DOCUMENT. 
(A) The record of the facts as heretofore set forth 
demonstrates conclusively that there was no area known 
as Dry Hollow Road, except as was invented by the 
ingenuity of Counsel and the Plaintiff. 
Section 27-12-89 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953 states: 
"A highway shall be deemed to have been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public 
when it has been continually used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." 
What constitutes dedication and abandonment to 
the use of the public has been interpreted by a number 
of Utah decisions. 
In Brown vs. the Oregon Shortline Railroad, 36 
Utah 257, 102 Pacific 740, the original owner of the 
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property in question had deeded various lots from an 
original piece. In addition, the grantor had deeded a 
right-of-way across his property to the grantees, their 
heirs and assigns, which was in fact, the only access to 
the property of the grantees. The strip used for ingress 
and egress was some 330 feet long and 0alled Morris 
A venue. The plaintiff grantees brought an action to 
have the so-called easement declared a public way. The 
court denied this application, saying in part as follows: 
"Dedication rests primarily on the intenti<?n, 
expressed or implied, Whitesides vs. Green, 13 
Utah 341, 44 Pacific 1032. There is nothing, 
either in the deeds or in the acts of the deceased, 
to show an intention, either expressed or implied 
upon his part to dedicate this strip to public use." 
The court concluded, 8aying: 
"The fact that anyone who has any social 
or business relations with either of the occupants 
of any of the parcels abutting upon the strip 
could pass over it did not make it a public--dist-
inguished from a private--easement." 
The Brown decision has not been overruled and 
has been cited by many jurisdictions as authority for 
the proposition that there must be a dedication, either 
expressed or implied, by the property owner for a period 
of ten years or more before it can be declared to be a 
public highway. 
Similarly, in Schettler vs. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 
Pacific 955, the court held that the dedication of land 
for highway purposes may either be express--as where 
the owner manifests his purpose by a grant evidenced 
by writing-- or implied--where acts or conduct of the 
owner clearly manifest his intention to devote land to 
public use. The court did also find that the dedication 
of land 1as highway may be inferred by the public's long · 
continued use of it, as such, with the knowledge of and 
without the objection of the owner. 
Again in Culmer vs. Salt Lake City, 27 Utah 252, 75 
Pacific 620, the court held that there was no dedication 
shown under this section, where it appeared that an 
alleyway, which had been more or less used by the 
public at will for a number of years, had, from time to 
time, been closed by abutting owners, who at all times 
exercised control over it. 
In the case at bar it cannot be disputed that the 
property of the Defendant was fenced, not only on the 
highway but entirely surrounding his property, and 
that it had been so fenced for a great number of years. 
Further, it cannot be denied that there was a gate in 
place, not only on the roadway but upon the entrance 
to the Plaintiff's property and that for a great number 
of years the same gate had been locked. Certainly, 
this cannot be held to demonstrate a lack of control of 
an intent to dedicate the public highway. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah had a 
somewhat different fact situation in Morris vs. Bliuit, 
49 Utah 243, 161 Pacific 1127. The plaintiff in that 
case was the owner of land and brought an action to 
restrain the defendants from traveling across it. The 
defendants admitted that the Plaintiffs did, in fact, own 
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the land but claimed a right-of-way across it and for 
the public, based upon the following facts : 
The original owner deeded to his grantee, who wa~ 
the defendant's predecessor in interest, a right-of-way. 
In addition, some of the people who lived west of the 
property traveled across the right-of-way frequently. 
The road or right-of-way was open without gates. There 
was no sign to the effect that there was no trespassing 
and that the roadway was a private roadway. Occupants 
and visitors of the occupants so deeded with the right-of-
way traveled this road to and from the house. A canal 
ran along the right-of-way and was serviced from the 
right-of-way and the workers used the same to clean 
and maintain the canal. Subsequently, the plaintiff 
placed a gate across the fence and halted traffic, pre-
venting them from using this particular road. The 
defendants claimed that the road had become a public 
highway from long and continued ues. Others claimed 
that by reason of the right-of-way this became pertinent 
to the land conveyed and indeed became a public highway. 
The Supreme Court denied all of the defendants' 
contentions, sustained the plaintiff, and held that the 
same was not a public right-of-way or public highway, 
even though used by workers cleaning the canal, by a 
few members of the public going to and from their homes, 
and by use of the homeowner to whim the right-of-way 
was given, saying: 
"A dedication rests primarily in the intf::nt 
of the owner. There must be a concession in-
tentionally made by him which may be proved 
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by declaration or by acts or may he inferred 
from the circumstances. ** * 
It must, however, appear that he knew of the use 
by the public and intended to grant the right-of , 
way to the public. No mormal aceeptance ]Jy 1 
any public officer is necessary, but there mus.t 
be the actual use by the public." 
Taking the present evidence, it is apparent that 
the only persons who used the right-of-way were some 
sheepmen who did so with permission of the owner, 
some people working on behalf of E>ither the School 
Board or the Petersen Ward who repaired and main-
tained the pipeline and who had permission to do so, 
together with certain deer hunters and predecps:;:or' 
of the Plaintiff, who did so without the knowledge and/or 
consent of the 'Owner, the Defendant or his predeccessors, 
except for one period of time when the Plaintiff's father 
may have had a key to one of the locked gates and as a 
consequence he must have been held to have used it by 
perm1ss10n. 
It is difficult to determine during what ten-year 
period the Plaintiff contends that there were gates, but 
no locks and by what theory the Plaintiff contends that 
these acts amounted to 'a desire on the part of the De-
fendant to dedicate a public thoroughfare. 
The court in Morris vs. Blunt further held that 
there was no way, that a private right-of-way c'.:ln be 
converted into a public right-of-way, that the public as 
such must use the road 'and the use under the claim of 
a private right is not sufficient, stating: 
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"If the thoroughfare is laid out or used as a 
private way, its use, however long, does not make 
it a public way, 'and the mere fact that the public 
also makes use of it without objection from the 
owner of the ground will not make it a public 
way. Before it becomes public in character, the 
owner of the ground must consent to the change." 
See also Gilmer vs. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 300 
Pacific 2d, 426. 
In another interesting ease, somewhat related to this 
particular problem, is Thimpson vs. Nelsen, 2 Utah 
2d, 340, 273 Pacific 2d, 720, wherein considering the evi-
dence to support the contention that a road was not a pub-
llic road, the court noted that the land in question sought 
to be declared to be a public highway led to no place of 
imblic interest. It was a dead end and was used only 
for the purpose of delivering merchandise and supplies 
to a building, not as a private road to private property. 
Here, the so-called right-of-way or public road led 
into grounds used only for hunting or grazing of sheep. 
The latest decision is that of Petersen vs. Combe, 
20 Utah 2d, 376, 438 Pacific 2d, 545. This, again, was 
a case where the plaintiff sought to have a county road 
decl:ared a public highway by public use for ten years 
pursuant to 27-12-89 U. C. A. 1953. In reversing the 
trial court decision, the court posed the following ques-
tion: 
"Was there sufficient evidence by competent 
testimony of witnes'ses who were not self-serving, 
to show by clear and convincing that the public 
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generally--not just a few having their own sper.ial 
and private interest in the road--had used the 
road continuously for ten years 7" We think ! 
that there was not such quantity or quality ad- · 
duced. Furthermore, we believe the testimony 
of plaintiff's own witne~s defeat:d _the plaintiff'~ 1
1
. 
own cause, upon the simple prmc1ple that "the , 
testimony of one's own witness is no stronger 
than its weakest link." 
The a;bove quotation fits at bar most admirably; 
except for fomily members of the Plaintiff, no witnesse~ 
in reality supported the Plaintiff. Indeed, the testimony 
of De Verl Lamb and particularly John L. Young demon-
strated that the ground was never a public way, that 
it had never been open to the public. These were the 
witnesses produced by the Plaintiff. 
(B) The Plaintiff now contends the dedication to 
public use by public document. This does not conform 
1Jo the facts. It is quite true that the Board of Education 
of Morgan County received a deed for 7.20 acres (Ex.1). 
It is further true that the Board of Education conveyeri 
that 7.20 acres to the Petersen Corporation of the Church 
of Jes us Christ of Latter Day Saints (Ex. 2). It is 
also true that Exhibits 1 and 2 included an easement 
for the purpose of transporting water from Bohman 
Springs to the 7.20 acres. Finally, it is true that the 
State of Utah took all of the 7 .20 acres of ground for 
the purpose of constructing an Interstate highway. 
At that time all the Petersen Ward had remaining was 
an easement to maintain a waterline to property no 
longer in existence. For that reason, the right-of-way 
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was conveyed to the Defendant hercin by quit claim deed 
(Ex. 3). 
The trial court, in its memorandum decision, said: 
"The right-of-way for the utilization of the 
pipeline was by grant to the School Boiard. The 
use of the road was to maintain their pipeline. 
The property served by the pipeline was trans-
ferred by the School Board to the Church, to. 
gether with the deed that it would be used for 
public's purpose. The "public's purposes" phrase 
would be for the seven acres and not to any ease-
ment for the utifomtion of the pipeline. ThC> 
School Board or their successor's in title using 
the roadway for the maintenance of their pipe-
line would be in conformance with their grant 
and not of public use." 
An examination of the complaint of the Plaintiff 
does not set forth any el-aim predicated upon a public 
dedication or upon any written instrument. The De-
fendant posed interrogatives to the Plaintiff on May 
23rd, 1969. Number two: 
"State whether on not said right-of-way is based 
upon any public document." Number Three: 
"State whether or not said right-of-way or clain1 
thereto is based upon any written document. If so, 
state the time, place of execution, and parties 
signatory thereto." 
In July of 1969, the Plaintiff, under oath, gave 
the following answers: "Two: "Said right-of-way is 
not based upon any public document." Three: "Said 
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right-of-way is not based upon any written document." 
The Plaintiffs herein did not object to the memo- , 
random decision as being in error relative to their 
claim of a grant predicated upon a written document. 
Their contention now appears for the first time before 
this court. It is neither timely nor correct factually. , 
An easement to maintain a pipeline, even if valid in the 
public, would be only for the purpose of maintaining a 1 
non-existent, unused pipe1ine and would afford the Plain-
tiff herein neither comfort nor assistance. 
Such an easement, even if present, could not be 
expanded, nor does the Plaintiff cite any facts or • 
authority in support of their position. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIL-
ING TO RULE UPON EACH OF THE PRESCRIP-
TIVE EASEMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
It is well established throughout this country that 
a prescriptive right can only arise by adverse use or 
enjoyment under a claim of right uninterrupted and con-
tinuous for a period of 20 years. Morris vs. Blunt cupra. 
The Plaintiff did not daim and no evidence was 
adduced to show any adverse use or enjoyment under 
a claim of right prior to the time that the father of the 
Plaintiff, Jerry Morgan, purchased ground now held by 
the Plaintiff in 1947. The Defendant purchased ground 
owned by him in 1964 (Tr. 5). He has prevented people 
from using that rnad since that time (Tr. 6). Even 
if one ignored the uncontroverted testimony that in 
1953, '54, '55, and '56 all of the gates between the proper-
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ties were locked ('l'r. 120), one would only have a period 
of seven teen years. 
Counselor attempts to get around that by saymg 
that the Plaintiff's predecessor in interest was given 
a key, and, as a result, was not denied the right or per-
mission to go through. He failed to state how this comes 
within his ffwn definition of "adverse use and enjoyment, 
1 1 uninterrupted and continuous." 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLIN-
ING TO FIND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD AC-
QUIRED A RIGII-OF-W AY FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
!1IAINT AINING A WATER RIGHT. 
The Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Jerry Mor-
gan, claimed to have acquired an interest in \Yater 
right number 270, Exhibit C. This exhibit provide:s on 
its face that "this application has not yet been approved 
by the state engineer this eighth day of January 1937.'' 
No evidence was introduced tending to show that the 
application for water right 270 had ever been approved 
or that it had, in fact, been transferred to the Plaintiff 
or any of her predecessors in interest. The deed to the 
Plaintiff's father, Jerry Morgan, (Defendant's Exhibit 
4, which was filed for record in Volume Q of Deeds, 
page 455 of the office of the Recorder of Morgan County-
Tr. 44) does not purport to grant a conveyance of any 
water right, either to the Plaintiff's predecessor in in-
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terest, either in the Bohman Springs or any other water 
right. No record was introduced from the office of th~ 
state engineer showing a decreed right to the use of 
any water from Bohman Springs or any other source 
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vested in the Plaintiff or in any of the Plaintiff's pred- ' 
ecessors in interest. The Plaintiff, therefore, showE<l 
no interest in any water right predicated upon any 
public document. 
The last sentence of 73-3-1, UTAH CODE ANNO- i 
TATED, 1953, which was adopted in 1939, and which 
amended 73-3-1, provides "no right to the use of water 
either appropriated or unapproprited can be acquired 
by adverse use or adverse possession." 
The Plaintiff did not contend either in pleading or 
by the evidence that she had acquired the right to water 
by adverse possession prior to 1939 and no evidence 
was introduced which would tend to support such a 
contention. 
No one would deny that the Plaintiff is entitled 
under the laws of the state to the protection of her 
rights; however, she produced no evidence to show thst 
she had any interest in any water right. She did not 
complain in her complaint that she had any water right 
or any right-of-way pre'dicated thereon or necessary for i 
the use thereof. She produced no evidence, documentary 
or otherwise, showing a water right, and there was n·i 
contention in the evidence that she had acquired a right 
by adverse possession. It is true that her father sa;d 
he had used some water commencing with the year 1947; 
he could not, however, produce any deed or documenta-
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tion as to his right and made no claim by adverse usage, 
which, of course, would have been spurious in view of 
the fact that he did not acquire the real property until 
1947, some eight years after the enactment of the amend-
ment to 73-3-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
CONCLUSION 
'l'he Plaintiff below appellant herein has filed her 
appeal ba'Sed upon three grounds. It is submitted that 
she failed to sustain her burden of proof by clear and 
convincing evidence on the first ground and has pro-
duced neither fact nor law to substantiate her position 
on the second and third grounds. The Plaintiff's appeal 
should be dismissed with costs to the Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE C. PATTERSON 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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